SunSi Energies Inc's (OTC: SSIE) goal is to become one of the world's largest producers of trichlorosilane ("TCS"). The Company plans to achieve this objective by acquiring and developing a portfolio of high-quality, scalable, strategically located TCS production facilities that possess a potential for future growth and expansion. U.S. based SunSi controls approximately 55,000 metric tons of TCS production in China.
SunSi stands to benefit from the announcement that China may be doubling its installations of solar panels this year, which will absorb the excess production that served to depress prices and margins in 2011. In a Bloomberg.com article, Alex Morales and Jacqueline Simmons wrote that acccording to an estimate by Suntech Power Holdings Co. CEO Zhengrong Shi, the nation may add 4 gigawatts or more of panels. Trina Solar Ltd. (TSL) CEO Jifan Gao predicted an addition of 5 gigawatts, which "compares with about 2.2 gigawatts installed in the country in 2011, more than double the capacity of the average nuclear reactor in the U.S."
Speaking through an interpreter during an interview at the World Economic Forum’s annual meeting in Davos, Switzerland, Gao commented that "it’s a huge market. Excellent companies with good technology, balance sheets and also brands will win out. A lot of companies without those advantages will be taken away."
Morales and Simmons noted that "solar shares have rebounded in recent weeks, driven in part by politics in Germany, the world’s largest solar market. After adding a record 7.5 gigawatts of panels last year, more than double the government’s target, lawmakers proposed cutting subsidies. A meeting Jan. 25 ended without an agreement and solar stocks climbed."
Read the full article at Bloomberg.com.
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Dr. James A. Hayward is Chairman, President, and CEO of Applied DNA Sciences (OTCBB: APDN). With over 20 years of experience in the biotechnology, pharmaceutical, life science and consumer product industries, Dr. Hayward is actively involved in the global effort to ensure the authenticity of products and the protection of global supply chains from counterfeiting and diversion.
Over the new year, President Obama signed a $700 billion National Defense Authorization Act which has caused an uproar. In a recent email and press release Hayward stated stated:
"I would like to call your attention to a part of the Act that is a straight-out positive, even game-changing event for the national security and economic life of the country, and ought to be heard above the noise.
It is the stunning piece of news that, packed into the Act, is an amendment which requires defense contractors to eliminate counterfeit parts from their operations. Companies are legally and financially liable if they sell counterfeits into the military supply--even if they did not produce the fakes, and even if that sale was inadvertent. In the language of the amendment, contractors have to detect them, avoid them, and if not, pay for their replacement and rework, or even face debarment.
We believe this legislation will shake up the semiconductor, aerospace, and other industries in a dramatic way. And our company is already there with a solution and expertise to help those industries. I hope you will take some time to read this, and consider helping us publicize this critical development."
The full press release states:
"The bipartisan amendment is a result of a Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) hearing on November 8, 2011 that exposed upwards of a million counterfeit parts in U.S. military supply chain. At the hearing, SASC Chairman Carl Levin (D-Mich) vowed to work with Senator John McCain (R-Ariz) in a bipartisan effort to legislate a solution to this "clear and present danger."
Here is a news report of that hearing:
Highlights of the legislation can be found here, and include the following:
- Require the Secretary of Homeland Security to establish a program of enhanced inspection of electronic parts imported from any country that is determined by the Secretary of Defense to be a significant source of counterfeit parts in the DOD supply chain. Authorize information sharing with original component manufacturers, to the extent needed to determine whether an item is counterfeit. (HR. 1540, SEC. 818)
- Require covered contractors that supply electronic parts or systems that contain electronic parts to establish policies and procedures to eliminate counterfeit electronic parts from the defense supply chain. (HR. 1540, SEC. 818)
- Require DOD to adopt policies and procedures for detecting and avoiding counterfeit parts in its own direct purchases, and for assessing and acting upon reports of counterfeit parts from DOD officials and DOD contractors. (HR. 1540, SEC. 818)
Applied DNA sells patent-protected DNA security solutions to protect products, brands and intellectual property from counterfeiting and diversion. SigNature DNA is a botanical mark used to authenticate products in a unique manner that essentially cannot be copied, and provide a forensic chain of evidence that can be used to prosecute perpetrators.
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SunSi Energies Inc's (OTC: SSIE) goal is to become one of the world's largest producers of trichlorosilane ("TCS"). The Company plans to achieve this objective by acquiring and developing a portfolio of high-quality, scalable, strategically located TCS production facilities that possess a potential for future growth and expansion. U.S. based SunSi controls approximately 55,000 metric tons of TCS production in China.
TCS is a chemical primarily used in the production of polysilicon, which is an essential raw material in the production of solar cells for PV panels that convert sunlight to electricity. TCS is considered to be the first product in the solar PV value chain before polysilicon, and is also the principal source of ultrapure silicon in the semiconductor industry. Below is the company's Executive Summary as of December 2011:
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SunSi Energies Inc's (OTC: SSIE) goal is to become one of the world's largest producers of trichlorosilane ("TCS"). The Company plans to achieve this objective by acquiring and developing a portfolio of high-quality, scalable, strategically located TCS production facilities that possess a potential for future growth and expansion. U.S. based SunSi controls approximately 55,000 metric tons of TCS production in China.
TCS is a chemical primarily used in the production of polysilicon, which is an essential raw material in the production of solar cells for PV panels that convert sunlight to electricity. TCS is considered to be the first product in the solar PV value chain before polysilicon, and is also the principal source of ultrapure silicon in the semiconductor industry. Below is the most recent SSIE Corporate Presentation:
For further information, please visit the company's website at www.sunsienergies.com.
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Yesterday, NeoStem, Inc. (AMEX:NBS, StockTwits: $NBS) announced that it has expanded its presence in China. The Company reported that an affiliated entity has entered into an agreement with Tianjin Nankai Hospital in the People’s Republic of China to offer NeoStem’s licensed adult stem cell treatments for orthopedic conditions. NeoStem currently has other licensing agreements in place which provide therapies for arthritis and orthopedic conditions in various areas of China.
This new agreement represents further opportunity for NeoStem as Tianjin is an international corporate hotspot that is home to more than 14 million people and over 400 hospitals. The Tianjin Nankai Hospital:
- has approximately 1,100 patient beds.
- has nearly 90 orthopedic-dedicated beds.
- is expanding with a new building which will boost the orthopedic bed count to approximately 1,000.
Dr. Robin L. Smith, Chairman and CEO of NeoStem, commented,
"We are very excited about our new relationship with Tianjin Nankai Hospital, another large Chinese hospital to grow revenues from mature adult stem cell-based treatments."
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Benjamin Shepherd and Yiannis G. Mostrous, Associate Editors of Personal Finance, had an intersting article this morning on ETFs fronting the top emerging-markets miners and second-tier gold producers, leveraged to the rising price of bullion. In their article at The Money Show.com, they stated:
"Hard assets are quickly becoming hot commodities among investors. The Chinese economy posted strong growth in 2009, leading to a 25% increase in steel consumption, a 42% jump in iron ore imports and a similar rise in imports of coal. The trend will continue this year and in 2011.
Furthermore, India’s economy will soon receive the same media attention lavished upon China. The world’s largest democracy has seen its economic growth gradually catch up to China’s. This means that commodities prices will rise again, once market participants realize the true potential of India’s economy and its implications for commodities demand."
Last week, Iron Mining Group (OTCBB: IRNN) announced their move into Mexico - "Iron Mining Group to Launch IMG Mexico, Expand into Mexican Iron Ore Market" to further grow their capacity to tap into China.
Iron Mining Group Mexico (“IMG Mexico”) was formed to explore iron ore mining, investment and trade opportunities in Mexico. The launch of IMG Mexico coincides with a Letter of Intent signed on November 22, 2010 for a joint venture investment into a junior iron ore mine resulting in an annual supply guaranty of 700,000 metric tons of high-grade iron ore for export to China against IMG’s existing Chinese sales contracts.
Here Eric Li, Senior Vice President of CBI China speaks about how China's iron ore demand was affected by 2009's downturn and what we can expect to see from China in 2010 and beyond:
IMG anticipates taking daily delivery of iron ore beginning in December 2010 and projects exporting its first 70,000 metric ton shipment from Mexico to China by February 2011, with subsequent ships leaving approximately every five weeks for a total of 700,000 metric tons delivered within the first year.
IRNN's management team will be based in Guadalajara, Mexico. Management has identified further investment targets allowing for increases in total monthly iron ore exports to greater than 500,000 metric tons by Q4 2011.
IRNN's CEO, Garrett K. Krause stated:
“Similar to our mining activities in Chile, we believe that there exists a substantial opportunity to make strategic joint venture investments in Mexico to gain access to attractive iron ore deposits. With IMG’s established Chinese buying demand, and with our ever-growing relationships in Mexico, we are uniquely positioned to act as a joint venture partner and solution provider to these otherwise restricted miners. Further, because Mexico has available port mineral loading terminals capable of handling Panamax ships, we can imminently begin exporting from this region at competitive shipping rates.”
Iron Mining Group, Inc., is a global iron ore mining company with its initial focus in Latin America. The Company has entered this marketplace at a time when the largest iron ore customer, China, seeks to alter the status quo by shifting power away from the traditional iron ore producers. Iron Mining Group has signed strategic joint venture agreements with several Chinese Steel Groups, which provide guaranteed long-term iron ore purchase agreements for 100% of available production.
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Iron Mining Group, Inc. (OTCBB: IRNN) today announced that its wholly-owned subsidiary, Chile Inversiones de Minerales, Ltda. has completed the initial acquisition of 50% of the La Serena Iron Sands Mine with which will automatically increase to 70% upon the repayment of $1,040,000 of pre-existing
debts through the sales iron ore from the property. On closing, IMG assumed management control of the mine and two port development projects in Chile’s Coquimbo region. Upon approval of its environmental declaration, anticipated in Q1 of 2011, IMG plans initial monthly production of 60,000 metric tons for projected revenue of USD $8.7 million and seeks to increase production growth to 180,000 metric tons with revenues of USD $26 million per month by July 2011.
The “iron sands” property is known as the La Serena Beach Mine, which spans two kilometers by one half kilometer, includes an existing mineral exploitation concession and a pending marine concession. Once granted, this marine concession will allow the mining of iron ore located along the ocean floor up to two kilometers offshore.
Based on geology and feasibility studies completed by the University of Santiago in 2009, the combined concessions are believed to contain up to 66,500,000 metric tons of recoverable high-grade iron ore located within the iron sands along the beach and the adjacent ocean floor, representing total estimated current market value of more than USD $9 billion. IMG plans to conduct further geological analysis and to subsequently file an initial 43-101 report on this property.
Furthermore, with the acquisition of two port development projects, IMG is committed to investing in port infrastructure allowing for significant growth in its total iron ore export capacity. Each of the two new ports is planned to accommodate Cape-sized vessels with a combined annual loading capacity of up to 18,000,000 metric tons.
Iron Mining Group CEO Garrett K. Krause stated:
“Having completed this acquisition, IMG is on track to begin production and export of iron ore from the La Serena Beach Mine in early 2011 followed by further production from our Atacama Desert and Tocopilla projects by Q3 of 2011. We look forward to working with the regional authorities and the local community to make this project impactful and beneficial for everyone involved. Further, we will immediately begin advancing our two associated port projects with support of our Chinese partners in order to accommodate increased annual iron ore export volumes from Chile’s Coquimbo region.”
Iron Mining Group is a global iron ore mining company with its initial focus in Latin America. The Company has entered this marketplace at a time when the largest iron ore customer, China, seeks to alter the status quo by shifting power away from the traditional iron ore producers. Iron Mining Group has signed strategic joint venture agreements with several Chinese Steel Groups, which provide guaranteed long-term iron ore purchase agreements for 100% of available production.
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Iron Mining Group, Inc. to Trade Under New Symbol, IRNN
Iron Mining Group (OTCBB: IRNN) is ProActive Capital's new client, and they just changed their stock symbol to IRNN as they have transitioned into a global "Iron Ore Mining" company that seeks global expansion. IRNN's initial focus is in Latin America.
Iron Mining Group has entered this marketplace at a time when the largest iron ore customer, China, seeks to alter the status quo by shifting power away from the traditional iron ore producers. Iron Mining Group has signed strategic joint venture agreements with several Chinese Steel Groups, which provide guaranteed long-term iron ore purchase agreements for 100% of available production.
As per IRNN's press release, prior to this name change, Iron Mining Group operated under the name WorldVest, Inc. and began exploring opportunities in the iron ore mining market in late 2009. In 2010, the Company signed two strategic iron ore purchase agreements with large Chinese buyers representing 11 years of buying contracts valued in excess of $2 billion per annum. On the strength of this buying demand, the Company completed the acquisition of 99.9% of Chile Inversiones de Minerales, Ltda. ("CIM"), which contains a portfolio of iron ore mining and port development projects across Chile and is currently evaluating additional global opportunities to acquire iron ore projects to fulfill this contract demand.
IRNN's Executive Chairman Garrett K. Krause stated in the press release:
"Having successfully completed the transition into a singularly focused iron ore mining and investment company, we believe Iron Mining Group is ideally positioned to pursue the continued acquisition and development of iron ore properties on a global basis. Our operating team is on the ground in Chile, working around the clock to prepare our existing properties for initial production scheduled for the first quarter of 2011, while at the same time management continues to analyze and evaluate additional iron ore opportunities on a global basis."
Below, Conrad Chase VP of Global Business Development gives a good viseo summary if IRNN's business model:
IMG / CIM "Atacama Desert Iron Ore Mine" Video Introduction
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Fear and uncertainty create patterns, paths of their own. And societies are again in a mosaic of uncertainty — and resultant fear — over the fate and durability of the social and security frameworks once taken for granted. Mass reaction to these fears will trigger transformative change. But there will be opportunities to seize and command change.
Almost all societies in the world have gone beyond the stage where they expect stability and linear progressions of the past to long endure. Some societies — almost en bloc — anticipate the end of their security; others anticipate the end of their suffering. Few expect insulation from change. That change, however, need not be entirely inscrutable if we look at global patterns and at historical human behaviour.
Economic Patterns: What we now call “economics” determines power and conflict patterns because wealth, or the deprivation of it, determines survival, and, for those who survive, “economics” determines the relative control they may have over individual and societal destiny. Thus social behavior determines economic viability, and the failure or success of economic patterns determines social corrective or compounding action.
We are about to see an acceleration of social reaction to economic failure - a reaction to the inflexibility of policies which have failed to adjust to changing circumstances.
Many finance ministers are speaking, still, as though their national economies can perform well with just minor adjustment to old patterns. This may not be so, particularly in the West, where the rapid growth in state revenues since the end of the Cold War pushed governments down the path of highly capital-intensive programs in areas which absolutely do not contribute to national productivity in essential manufactures or primary industry, and in many cases actually constrain productivity rises. As wealth grew, and tax revenues rose commensurately, the logical approaches of governments in market economies should have been to reduce taxation and further stimulate investment.
This occurred only rarely and incompletely. Taxpayers, also benefiting from rising wealth, themselves did not demand that governments constrain their spending. The situation thus created massive state sector positions in the Western economies. When recession strikes, industry and private citizens scale back and pay the price, but governments are less flexible. Unions and state workers make themselves immune to cuts and to the realities of the “real world”.
In countries such as Greece, France, Spain, Portugal, and so on (and now the US, UK, Australia, etc.), those in the private sector who have come to rely on state handouts — and therefore become “agents” for statism, and by default are opposed to market freedom — compound the entrenched political class’ view that the state should not undergo the kind of profound self-analysis and restructuring which the private sector must embrace.
The US, Australia, Greece, and so on, as just a few examples, are undergoing per capita productivity declines just at the time when they need to be developing a strategic buffer of internally-balanced economies and the ability to better compete internationally. And there is a fear that if wasteful government spending on huge capital projects ceases, then economies will collapse.
This fearful, selfish, and ignorant intellectual process within governments has been caused by the hubris generated by unfettered control of great wealth, and the presses which print the money. But governments only have the ability, in real terms, to dominate the non-productive — or, at best, productivity-enabling infrastructure — spending. Only by returning spending power to the innovative sections of society (in other words, the people) can economies become nimble and productive.
This is unlikely to happen, so we should expect sudden contractions in buying power in many Western states over the coming few years.
We are also already witnessing the contraction of some aspects of multinational mechanisms to amass and deploy capital wherever the market determines it can profitably be invested. Part of this contraction derives from the situation in which the world is entering a period where it may soon be without a viable global reserve currency. This in turn leads to the point where trade becomes more bilateral; investment scope becomes limited in some respects; and nationalism — and with it, protectionism — revives out of economic necessity.
There have been many factors leading to the revival of nationalism since the collapse of the brief (45 year) bipolar global strategic framework in 1990-91, and these were touched upon (certainly by this writer) from 1990 onward. So the seeming uncertainty in which we now find ourselves did not emerge suddenly or without understandable cause.
Perhaps, then, our “uncertainty” is not so uncertain?
Strategic Patterns: What clarity is emerging?
- Western economies will continue to decline, in real and strategic terms (if not in nominal accounting terms), unless truly radical re-structuring occurs, including the rapid and massive reduction of the size of government intervention in economies. This means an end to the era of entitlement welfare.
- No democratically-elected government will dare face voters if it reduces “bread for the masses”, that method of cheaply buying votes. So most governments will continue to jeopardize their nations — by continuing the bribery of the electorate — in order to remain in office. Change, then, should only be expected through the appearance of massive threat, or national collapse, enabling the emergence of decisive leadership not based on the popular vote.
- Those states which abandon forms of taxation (such as those based on carbon emissions) which curb productivity will fare better than those which do not.
The immediate future, then, will be commanded not by electoral “democracies”, but by decisive non-populist leaders who truly return productivity to the marketplace.
Russia and the People’s Republic of China are thus favored.
By. Gregory R. Copley, of www.GlobalintelligenceReport.com . For Breaking Geopolitical Intelligence, economic forecasting, trends and similar, visit the
Global Intelligence Report.
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New strategic brinkmanship by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK); a now-clear determination by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to “more aggressively assert its territorial claims in regional waters”; the near-collapse of Japanese strategic cohesion during 2010; and the increasing signs of US political caution in North-East Asia, all point to a period of strategic concern for the Republic of China, particularly in its maritime responsibilities.
What is of particular concern is that the casus belli — the legitimate cause and act of war — thrown down by the DPRK with the March 26, 2010, sinking of the South Korean Po Hang-class corvette, ROKS Cheonan, highlighted the lack of readiness of the ROK, the US, and Japan to be able to handle any major regional crisis. This in turn highlights the extreme vulnerability of the Republic of China, given that the US is showing great reluctance to support the Republic of Korea, and would be even more reluctant to take major steps to support the ROC at this particular time.
As well, the sinking of the Cheonan highlighted the vulnerability of the ROK Navy to even fairly basic submarine attack, emphasizing the concern which all navies — including the US — must have for improving anti-submarine warfare (ASW).
As a result, the naval and maritime strategies, doctrine, and options of the Republic of China Navy (ROCN) face a period of great challenge, and the need for serious review. The ROCN has grown to become a highly-professional, technologically-advanced, world-class navy, but it must now function in a new ocean of uncertainty, and in the expectation that it will not have a reliable network of alliances.
The ROC is at a watershed, a pivotal point, in its history, and this transition point has been a long time in coming. Finally, however, both the ROC and its allies must face serious decisions, and, inevitably, the ROC Navy is very much at the heart of this great challenge.
The strategic circumstances surrounding the ROC have changed, even in ways which might not, at first glance appear to have been determined solely by the end of the Cold War in 1990-91. Some of the changes in the Republic of China’s overall strategic position were, of course, determined during the Cold War, first by the move in late 1971 by the United Nations to transfer the Chinese membership in the world body, of which Chiang Kai-shek’s ROC was a founder in 1945-46, from the ROC, and grant it to the People’s Republic of China (PRC).
Next came the initiative in 1972 of US Pres. Richard Nixon to open ties with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as a means of breaking Beijing away from Moscow. Following that, US Pres. Jimmy Carter on January 1, 1979, recognized the People’s Republic of China as the sole government of China, and unilaterally moved the US away from its alliance the ROC. Essentially, Carter unilaterally broke a binding alliance structure, a fact which should not go unnoticed by the United States’ many other allies around the world. Carter’s initiative to abandon the ROC was a move of appeasement toward the PRC, but, in many respects, it could have been seen as inevitable, given the strategic mass of the PRC in comparison with that of the ROC.
Even earlier, as well, the policy of the US John F. Kennedy Administration (1961 to 1963) was to restrain the Republic of China from taking advantage of the disarray at that time on the mainland. The Kennedy Administration policy at the time was to ensure that the ROC did not launch a military assault against the communist forces on the mainland, perhaps starting a major conflict in which the US could become embroiled at a time in which Washington was already engaged in brinkmanship with the USSR.
Later, although there have been many other factors as well, the deployment by the US William Clinton Administration of the two US Navy carrier battle groups to the Taiwan Straits in 1996, under orders from US Defense Secretary William Perry, was an important watershed in its own right. At that point, the US recognized that it did not have the capacity to repeat the projection of carrier power into the Straits in support of the ROC, even if it wished to, or unless the survival of the US itself was at stake.
By that time, it was already clear that US carrier battle groups could not be protected from hostile supersonic cruise missile attacks, and even later it became clear that the PRC could also use tactical ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads in specific anti-fleet modes, while the PRC — and, for that matter, Russian — Kilo- and Improved Kilo-class and submarines could comprehensively penetrate the defenses of US carrier battle groups.
But even with all these caveats, nothing has transformed the strategic situation of the ROC so much as the rising wealth of the PRC in the post-Cold War, post-Mao Zedong era. The economic growth of the PRC in the post-Cold War world has been matched in the past few years by the growing strategic, economic, and political stagnation of the United States. The PRC — with a 2009 GDP of $4.9-trillion — is becoming more strategically mobile, while the US, with a GDP in 2009 of $14.256-trillion, some three times larger, is in strategic consolidation or even, geopolitically, in strategic contraction.
What are some of the critical aspects of this transformed situation, insofar as they affect the maritime and naval strategies of the Republic of China?
1. The PRC’s defense budget, including its naval budget, has grown substantially, to the point where in every measure of funding, manpower, and even self-reliance, the People’s Liberation Army-Navy (PLAN) can comprehensively outmaneuver the ROCN. That part of the PRC defense budget which is known — and much of the PRC defense budget is, we know, obscured — was confirmed by the PRC Government in the beginning of March 2010 at 532.1-billion yuan, or US$78-billion, an increase of 7.5 percent over 2009, following the 2009 official growth in defense spending in the PRC was 14.9 percent.
2. As a result of the new wealth of the PRC — and as a result of the effective removal of US alliance support, other than some military supply, for the ROC — mainland China is now in a position to consider that the factors which once inhibited it from physically invading the ROC territory are now overcome. In other words, there is now nothing which could stop a PRC military adventure against the ROC, as messy and costly as it would be, in the event — albeit a low probability — that Beijing should decide on such an option.
3. The ROC Armed Forces, and particularly the Navy, suffer enormously from the fact that they cannot exercise regularly with foreign forces. Nothing depletes a force capability more seriously or rapidly than being unable to exercise against the highest level of potential threat, with other sophisticated armed forces.
4. The ROC Navy has essentially abandoned its potential for self-reliance in warship and major systems construction, and is therefore falling behind world standards in its surface and submarine capabilities in terms of quantity, quality, and self-reliance. This is in large part due to two factors:
(a) The leadership of the ROCN became afraid to recommend development of major vessels, particularly submarines, in shipyards on Taiwan because of the fear that contracting scandals of the type which plagued the purchase of the LaFayette-type frigates — the Kang Ding-class — from France in the 1990s would destroy careers; and
(b) The belief, based on a faulty understanding of US reality, that the US would fulfill Pres. George W. Bush’s promise to sell conventional submarines to the ROCN. It was my duty — merely as a private citizen in 2006 — to convey to the ROC Minister of Defense the reality that the US Navy would never obey the US President’s command to find these submarines on the world market and supply them to the ROC. Thus, the ROCN lost its self-reliance because of fears over career security on the one hand, fuelled by wishful thinking that the US would “save” them, on the other.
5. The ROCN has become gradually isolated from maritime mainstream thinking, and as a result the ability of ROC Armed Forces’ officers to speak foreign languages — particularly English — has declined over the past decades. This, along with budget and diplomatic constraints, makes it virtually impossible for the ROC to participate fully in global intelligence and strategic forums.
6. The ROC has absented itself from major maritime obligations, such as participation in remote counter-piracy operations and sea-lane security policies, even though the ROC was at one time a world leader in studying and understanding all matters relating to the security of Sea Lines of Communications (SLOCs). Despite this, the ROC is, if anything, more dependent on global sea trade security to ensure the delivery of raw materials to the ROC economy. This is an economy which continues to grow, but without any meaningful security of supply. Moreover, the ROC has also virtually ceased competing on the global resource market.
7. The PRC has, in 2010, made it clear that will now begin contesting maritime areas which it had not had the resources to contest in the past. This is a direct challenge not only to the ROC’s dominions in the South China Sea, but to other states’ resources and sea lanes as well, including those of Japan, and potentially the Republic of Korea, the Philippines, Vietnam, and so on.
8. The ROC has not undertaken any meaningful initiatives to rebuild, or build, credible — if discreet — military and intelligence relations with, for example, India, which is itself now increasingly challenged by PRC geopolitical expansion, both maritime and land-based.
9. The ROC is increasingly being put in the position where it will soon have no other option but to develop a strategic modus vivendi with the PRC. This will — de facto — create a broadened “confederation of China”, in which the ROC will take a position similar to, but perhaps more important than, Hong Kong. But at some point, the US will see that the ROC has nowhere to go except into an accommodation with the PRC, and at that time Washington will cut off delivery of advanced weapons systems to the ROC.
10. The ROC is now, then, in a position at which it must decide whether or not it wishes to pursue sovereignty in an absolute sense. If it wishes this, then it will need to:
(a) Resume defense industrial self-reliance to a far greater degree than is now the case;
(b) Resume an aggressive global intelligence and discreet diplomatic capability to build tacit or express alliances or capabilities; and
(c) Resume a more aggressive posture with regard to the control of access to essential raw materials, and the means to safeguard their delivery to Taiwan. In order to achieve this, the ROC would need immediately to begin rebuilding its strategic analytical capabilities, and the foreign language capabilities of its military officer corps.
The watershed now being confronted by the ROC in pursuing its sovereignty and maritime interests highlights challenges facing other regional and global trading powers, who need to ensure sea lane security from the Indian Ocean, northward to the Philippines, the Republic of Korea, Japan, and Taiwan, given the prospect that the PRC now clearly intends to prosecute its strategic ambitions with regard to maritime control.
Questions still exist about the viability of the People’s Liberation Army-Navy (PLAN) to achieve these ambitions in the short-term, but absent any clear challenge from other regional powers, including India, and from the US, the PRC can prosecute its ambitions unopposed.
With this in mind, the issue of the sovereignty and intentions of the ROC become of significance to the global community, not just to the ROC itself.
Analysis by Gregory R. Copley for Oilprice.com who offer detailed analysis on Oil, alternative Energy, Commodities, and Geopolitics. They also provide free Geopolitical intelligence to help investors gain a greater understanding of world events and the impact they have on certain regions and sectors. Visit:
http://www.oilprice.com
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